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SOME TYPICAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF ENGLISH SOCIOLOGY TO POLITICAL THEORY

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ABSTRACT

Wallas disposed of the intellectualistic psychology, which had distorted political and economic theory since the days of Bentham, indicated the importance of symbolism in political psychology, pled for a more synthetic psychology of society and for the introduction of the quantitative method in social analysis, and emphasized the need of controlling social evolution through a development of concerted volition and social teleosis. He has, however, indicated the psychological problems in modern society rather than offered any practical solution of them. In the work of Rivers and others one may discern the first significant attempt to apply the Freudian mechanism to an explanation of social processes.

VI. GRAHAM WALLAS (1858-) AND THE ATTEMPT TO PROVIDE A SYNTHETIC INTERPRETATION OF POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY

I. *Nature and scope of his writings.*—An exceedingly suggestive attempt by an Englishman to apply psychology to the treatment of political problems is to be found in the later works of Graham Wallas, professor of political science in the University of London. Mr. Wallas, like Bagehot, is a happy combination of the student and the practical man of affairs—something that is distressingly rare in America, but need not be so if Mr. Wallas' suggestions are carried out in the near future. This healthy combination of the scholar and observer of practical affairs gives to his works that intellectual flavor so remote from the writings of the agitator, and that concreteness and grasp upon actual conditions which is so conspicuously absent from most of the academic works upon political science. Mr. Wallas entered the field of political literature as one of the authors of the famous *Fabian Essays* of 1888. His first extended work, however, was the splendid biography of Francis Place published in 1897. The works which contain his chief political theories are *Human Nature in Politics*, published in 1908, *The Great Society*, published in 1914, and his American lectures, *Our Social Heritage*, published in 1921. As these works will be analyzed below, all that need be mentioned in this place are some of the outstanding general characteristics of his writings.

In the first place, his early training as a classical scholar gave him a thorough grasp of the Platonic and Aristotelian political theories, to which he often recurs for example and comparison. His connections with the Fabian Society generated a rational and conscientious desire for sound social reform. Finally, his interest in that modern functional psychology, of which William James was the first great exponent, has led him to think along psychological lines in both his academic studies and his practical relations to political problems, and to attempt to apply psychological principles consistently in formulating plans for social and political betterment. Important in his political psychology is his emphasis upon the instinctive and subconscious processes of mind as important factors in determining conduct. In this regard he mentions his indebtedness to the suggestive essays of Dr. Trotter. While this is a step in the right direction it is to be regretted that his first work evidences no acknowledged acquaintance with the vast development of this field by psychologists like Morton Prince, Boris Sidis, and Sigismund Freud, Karl Jung and the psychoanalysts. Of course reference is here to the general foundations of their theories, and not to the purely psychopathic applications with which they are mainly concerned. Mr. Wallas seems to have reached empirically many of their fundamental doctrines, and in his last works he specifically acknowledges his indebtedness to their conceptions. Yet, in spite of a courageous attempt to modernize political psychology, some critics have complained that Mr. Wallas has not entirely freed himself from some vestiges of the older psychology and logic. Mr. Ernest Barker, for example, in discussing the *Human Nature and Politics*, has summarized some of these possible defects:

Many lines of criticism occur. Something could be said of its sensationalist premises; something of its nominalist philosophy; something of that tendency to explain the higher in terms of the lower, which leads to the explanation of civilised life by the conditions of life in prehistoric times and to the repeated coupling of man with "the other animals." We might urge that reason is none the less reason when it is not conscious inference, and that it is a fallacy to derationalize political society because it is not an explicit organization of conscious reason. Better however than to criticise is to emphasise the truths which Mr. Graham Wallas suggests.¹

¹ *Political Thought in England from Herbert Spencer to the Present Day*, p. 156.

2. *Specific contributions to political theory.*—

a) *Human Nature and Politics*—the attempt to provide a more scientific political psychology. In his *Human Nature and Politics*¹ Mr. Wallas criticizes the defects in the modern psychological interpretations of political processes; outlines a rational method of remedying these defects; and suggests the main improvements which may be hoped for from such procedure. His main thesis is that either psychology is wholly omitted in the modern treatment of politics, or, if employed at all, is of the old erroneous hyper-intellectualistic type coming down from Bentham which deals with man as a calculating machine uninfluenced by emotion. The following passages well indicate the general line of his argument on this point. “For the moment, therefore, nearly all students of politics analyze institutions and avoid the analysis of man. The study of human nature by the psychologists has, it is true, advanced enormously since the discovery of human evolution, but it has advanced without affecting or being affected by the study of politics.”² He points out the domination of the old-fashioned views about human nature by referring to certain passages by Professors Ostrogorski, Bryce, and Merivale as good examples. “Apparently Merivale means the same thing by ‘abstract’ political philosophy that Mr. Bryce means by ‘ideal’ democracy. Both refer to a conception of human nature constructed in all good faith by certain eighteenth-century philosophers, which is now no longer exactly believed in, but which, because nothing else has taken its place, still exercises a kind of shadowy authority in a hypothetical universe.”³

If so, the passage (by Mr. Bryce) is a good instance of the effect of our traditional course of study in politics. No doctor would now begin a medical treatise by saying “the ideal man requires no food, and is impervious to the action of bacteria, but this ideal is far removed from the actualities of any known population.” No modern treatise on pedagogy begins with the statement that “the ideal boy knows things without being taught them, and his sole wish is the advancement of science, but no boys like this have ever existed.”⁴

¹ This work is well reviewed by another leader in English political thought, Professor J. A. Hobson, in the *Sociological Review* (1909), pp. 293-94. See also Barber's excellent analysis in his *Political Thought from Spencer to the Present Day*, pp. 153-57.

² Wallas, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 128.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 127.

This essay of mine is offered as a plea that a corresponding change (i.e., corresponding to the revolution of modern criminology and pedagogy by psychology) in the conditions of political science is possible. In the great University whose constituent colleges are the universities of the world, there is a steadily growing body of professors and students of politics who give the whole day to their work. I cannot but think that as the years go on, more of them will call to their aid that study of mankind which is the ancient ally of the moral sciences.¹

The fundamental basis of political psychology is to be found in the mental organization of the individual acted upon by the stimuli of the political environment.² The individual is, psychologically considered, a bundle of impulses and potential responses to external stimulation. These impulses are the product of the mental evolution of the race, and the proper and normal functioning of the individual in political society depends upon an adequate stimulation of these impulses and predispositions to thought and action. In analyzing the foundations of individual and social psychology the first prerequisite is that one give up the old psychology which maintained that human acts were calculated the means to a preconceived end, and recognize that the vast mass of human mental processes are subconscious or half-conscious—the result of instinctive or habitual impulses.³ “Whoever sets himself to base his political thinking on a re-examination of human nature must begin by trying to overcome his own tendency to exaggerate the intellectuality of mankind.”⁴ The chief political impulses which Mr. Wallas distinguishes are affection, fear, ridicule, desire for property, pugnacity, suspicion, curiosity, and the desire to excel.⁵ Each of these impulses is most effective in proportion as it acts without competition with other impulses, arises from personal stimulation, and results from an appeal to an instinct formed early in the evolution of the race.⁶ For this reason the artificial and recently developed stimulation of books and news-

¹ Wallas, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 21 ff., 59 f. This theory of social psychology had, of course, been systematically developed by Professor Giddings in his 1903 address at New Orleans and in his *Historical and Descriptive Sociology*.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 21, 98, 138.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 30 ff.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 38 ff.

papers is transient in its effect, and the emotions caused by the bodily presence and personal characteristics and experiences of a political candidate are much more stirring and lasting than his appeal to abstract principles.¹ Elections are planned for the purpose of creating an impulsive personal affection for the candidate rather than a reasoned conclusion as to his merits or the excellence of his platform.² Again, as the frequent repetition of a subject tends to create an impression of unreality upon both speaker and audience, the successful political leader must vary his appeal, and, since the conditions of human evolution have required a mixture of privacy and social intercourse, the individual in modern life does not thrive unless this proper proportion of both is maintained. But such a course is difficult for the politician who is called upon to be in almost perpetual association with his party workers.³ Finally, all political impulses are likely to be greatly intensified if they are stimulated when individuals are assembled in a crowd. This psychic instability of crowds may result from the fact that a stampede of the primitive social groups was the surest way to safety.⁴

The political environment, as the stimulus which operates upon the impulsive dispositions of men, differs from the latter in that it is much more variable. Human nature has apparently changed but little since the beginning of the historic era. Therefore, any great reforms must be based upon the improvement of the political environment rather than upon the hope of a fundamental revolution of human nature.⁵ But even if no considerable change in human nature may be looked for, an understanding of its characteristics and functioning may be able to effect a real transformation in conduct quite aside from changes in the environment. Now the most significant thing about the political environment is that the great political entities which stimulate mankind are mainly recognized by the mind through symbols. The mind does not as a rule comprehend the whole complex of ideas presented by a political entity, but associates this complex with some aspect, image, or interpretation of it which serves as a symbol for the

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 43 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 44 ff.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 30 f.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 53 ff.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 59 ff.

whole.¹ For example, the royal staff or other insignia of office tend to symbolize the institution of royalty, and the individual is content to let it stop with this, rather than proceeding to analyze the whole history and psychology of kingship. Even language itself is mainly intelligible to us through its symbolic significance, and the symbols which every word represents will naturally differ among individuals according to the experiences of their past life. The farther back the origin of the complex of ideas which are thus symbolized the greater emotional value that will attach to the symbol.² A good example of the necessity for having a deep emotional association for a symbol is seen in the difficulty of attracting loyalty for a newly constructed nation, dynasty, or aristocracy. Some of the most important symbolized political entities are parties, countries, justice, freedom, rights.³ Of all modern political entities which stimulate the individual impulses the party is the most important and powerful. While the party may have an intellectual origin and be designed to achieve a definite end, it will have little strength or duration unless it secures sufficient emotional values for its symbols, such as party colors, tunes, names, and the like.⁴ A skilful party uses its symbols in the same way that a commercial concern employs its trademarks and advertisements. The nature of the thing symbolized may vary considerably, but that is not as important to the success of the party as that the high emotional content of the symbol be sustained.⁵ If a candidate is not properly symbolized by his party he has no chance of success. The most insignificant nonentity properly associated with the party symbols is much more likely to be successful in an election than the strongest personality in a country, who has cut himself off from all party connections and makes an appeal to the intelligence of the voters.⁶ The instances of a man forming a successful political entity in himself are rare.⁷ Even in such cases,

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 54 ff; 138.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 65 ff.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 83 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 72 ff.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 87 ff.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 90 f. A generalization well borne out by the Progressive campaign of 1912 and the presidential election of 1920 in the United States.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 95 f.

a man must adhere for a long time to a given set of principles, so that his followers may attach a high emotional value to them. This same persistence in doctrine must be the rule for every newspaper that desires to be the successful organ of a party.¹

Mr. Wallas next makes a specific inquiry as to the extent to which reason enters into political action. His conclusion is essentially the same as that presented by Mr. Benjamin Kidd, namely, that reason plays but a small part in political life. The process by which he reaches this conclusion is quite different, however, from that employed by Kidd. Instead of arbitrary definitions and a priori assumptions, Mr. Wallas bases his judgment on a continuation of his acute psychological analysis of human conduct. While it is difficult to say at just what point instinctive and habitual actions end and reasoned action begins, it is certain that there is a very large field for subconscious non-rational inference in our mental processes, and it is equally unquestionable that the majority of our political opinions are reached in the second manner. Men even seem to attach the greatest emotional significance to the opinions which are reached intuitively rather than to those which are the result of reasoned conclusions.² While such subconscious impulses may be a fairly satisfactory guide for general affairs, since they are usually the result of several convergent suggestions, such is not the case in the field of our political thoughts and actions. It is the primary purpose of the political art to exploit our tendency to reach our opinions in a subconscious manner, and it aims so to stimulate our subconscious mind that we will automatically agree with the position which it is desired to establish.³

Yet, after all, reasoning in politics may better be designated as extremely difficult, rather than impossible. The difficulty is two-fold. In the first place man has to create the political entities about which he reasons, and these in turn are represented to the mind through symbols largely subconscious in their psychic operation. In the second place, while reasoning in pure science is based upon the comparison of concrete similar objects, or of objects alike in certain abstract qualities, political psychology has never found a satisfactory standard for comparing men. Neither

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 96-97.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 99 ff., 110 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 104 ff.

the Platonic idealism, Locke's theological ethics, Rousseauian natural rights, or Benthamite hedonism are able to furnish this standard for comparison.¹ As a substitute for the failures of political psychology in the past, Mr. Wallas offers a synthetic program for the scientific study of political phenomena which will make reasoning in politics possible. The whole problem is to obtain, arrange, and study as many facts about man as are available.² The beginning of this study should be a thorough acquaintance with the facts about human behavior which can be gained from the latest developments in psychology. Little or nothing can be hoped for from a study of formal political science based upon analyses of constitutions and unreal intellectualistic presuppositions.³ Next, the only way to get any idea of the human type, with its infinite variations in thought and action, is to measure these variations by the statistical method and get some conception of the modal type and the nature and amount of the variations from this type. One must get in the habit of thinking in terms of statistical curves.⁴ Finally the environment, natural and social, must be studied in the same manner, with a view to discovering the interaction between the individual and the environment.⁵ Most real statesmen now think quantitatively, but do it roughly and automatically.⁶ What is needed is such a cultivation of the scientific method as will allow one to start in political life with that exact quantitative knowledge which is now crudely and subconsciously acquired only after long experience. Mr. Wallas finds an indication of a step in the right direction in the present employment of statistics in the governmental bureaus and in the taking of censuses. The information thus compiled allows the citizens to check the wild statements of politicians designed to stir emotion but based on false assumptions and inaccurate information.⁷

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 114 ff.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 121 f.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 123 ff.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 132 ff. Of course this line of approach had been pointed out by Quetelet a half-century before, and by Jevons as early as 1882 in his *The State in its Relation to Labor*.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 134 ff.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 149 ff.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 155 ff.

Mr. Wallas then takes up a consideration of the results which may be expected from an application of his proposed methods of study of the political processes. In the first place, the faulty intellectualistic conceptions of political conduct would be abandoned, and the knowledge of actual political methods would allow individuals to fortify themselves against exploitation by masters of the art of political manipulation, and would help them curb the evil in the present methods.¹ As soon as men are made conscious of the nature and genesis of the political thoughts and actions which have hitherto been but subconscious, they will be able to handle the situation with relative ease. In fact, Mr. Wallas advocates a sort of general political psychotherapy analogous to that of the latest developments in psychiatry, based on the conception that a pathological political system will be relieved as soon as the mass of the citizens are made conscious of the actual nature of their malady. Certain half-conscious progress in this direction may be seen in the growing use of such terms as "spell-binder" and "sensational," which make men a little less susceptible to those mental influences thus designated. The extension of this knowledge must, however, be deliberate and vigorous if it is to keep ahead of the continually improving art of political exploitation. While this extension of political knowledge may be aided by intellectual appeals through preaching and teaching, it can never succeed on a large scale until it is given an emotional background.² That there may sometime be a co-ordination of thought and feeling, leading to a reformed and purified political system, is indicated by the action of the Japanese as revealed to the world in their struggle with Russia.³

The next question that arises is the relation of the foregoing suggestions to the reform of representative democracy, which, while by no means an entire success, may be regarded as the most satisfactory type of government yet devised.⁴ While the consent of the governed may be accepted as an essential condition to democratic government, what is most needed at present is a reform in the electoral system—the modern method of registering consent.⁵

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 169 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 195 ff.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 181 ff.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 1 ff., 199 ff.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 206 ff.

It is useless to attempt to create a superior governing class which will live apart from the emotions of the world; what is really urgent is to make an election similar to a jury trial, in that it be designed to obtain the facts in the circumstances and render an intelligent verdict.¹ The pressing need is to improve the methods by which political opinions are formed rather than merely expressed.² Encouraging steps have been taken in the English laws against bribery and inordinate expenditures in election. The old tendency of attempting to solve the problem through purely intellectual appliances reappears in the proposal of Mill for public voting and that of Lord Courtney for proportional representation. Much more desirable is an abolition of the elements of mob-suggestion and intimidation in elections; the spread of education in political methods; and the increase in the number of persons actively interested in the political life of the nation.³ The greatest improvement in the nineteenth century in political administration was the establishment of a permanent and efficient civil service in England and America.⁴ This branch of the government is the really effective "Second Chamber," for the information which it collects leads to the discrediting of the emotional appeals of a W. J. Bryan, which are based upon gross ignorance of facts.⁵ A consistent improvement and extension of the civil service is one of the most promising moves toward a better political system.⁶

International politics like internal policies may greatly improve if subjected to a psychological reconstruction. "The future peace of the world turns largely on the question whether we have, as is sometimes said and often assumed, an instinctive affection for those human beings whose features and color are like our own, combined with an instinctive hatred for those who are unlike us."⁷ Since the days of Aristotle there has come a great change in the conception of the possible extent of a state. The modern state can no longer be a thing of direct observation; it can only

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 201 ff. The reader will observe that Mr. Wallas refers to English jury trials.

² *Ibid.*, p. 218.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 229 ff.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 249.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 248 ff., 257.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 258 ff.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

exist as a mental entity, symbol, or abstraction. It was the position of Mazzini and Bismarck that no state could be successful unless composed of homogeneous peoples. This view has since been weakened, since different nationalities have prospered within successful states, and modern imperialism and colonization have tended to unite politically European and non-European types. What is now to be desired is not national or imperial egoism, but a recognition of the value of national differences. This stage might have been reached already if it had not been for the misinterpretation of Darwinism which represented war as the chief agent of progress.¹ A healthy sign is the present tendency among biologists and sociologists to represent progress as the result of co-operation quite as much as the outcome of struggle:

No one now expects an immediate, or prophesies with certainty an ultimate, Federation of the Globe; but the consciousness of a common purpose in mankind, or even the acknowledgment that such a common purpose is possible, would alter the face of world politics at once. The discussion at the Hague of a halt in the race of armaments would no longer seem utopian, and the strenuous profession by the colonizing powers that they have no selfish ends in view might be transformed from a sordid and useless hypocrisy into a fact to which each nation might adjust its policy. The irrational race hatred which breaks out from time to time on the fringes of empire, would have little effect in world politics when opposed by a consistent conception of the future of human progress.²

b) *The Great Society* and the psychological problems of modern industrial civilization. When Mr. Wallas' second work, *The Great Society*, appeared (in 1914), several new and interesting developments in his general sociological thinking came to light.³ His first work, while stating that a sound psychology of society and politics must rest upon a consideration of both individual traits and the social environment which stimulates them, had been primarily limited to a consideration of the manner in which individual characteristics emerge in political life. *The Great Society* is logically devoted mainly to a consideration of the social and

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 273 ff.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 294-95.

³ This book is reviewed by E. L. Talbert in the *American Journal of Sociology* (March, 1915), pp. 708-11; and by A. B. Wolfe, in the *American Economic Review* (June, 1915), pp. 311 ff. The latter is especially to be commended.

political environment, and of the desirable methods whereby it can be reconstructed so as to provide a more complete set of stimuli for the individual personality. It seems that Mr. Wallas had been affected by an afterthought that he had done his work too well in his earlier book. His clear and convincing demonstration that modern political activities are based upon a distressingly small amount of intelligent action on the part of anyone except the leaders in party exploitation seemed to trouble him. While he had clearly stated in the *Human Nature in Politics* that our only hope lies in the increase of the deliberate intelligent consideration that can be applied to political organization and administration, he apparently felt that a better case should be made out for the position and function of thought. The scope of his second work is considerably broader than that of the first. Instead of devoting his attention primarily to the problems of contemporary politics he makes a psychological analysis of our modern civilization which has grown up since the Industrial Revolution, which he designates as *The Great Society*. As he found representative democracy to be an experiment which was not entirely successful, so he discovers that our modern civilization has developed serious problems, unforeseen by most of those who witnessed the transformation, but which are threatening enough to render the question of its ultimate success problematical rather than assured. To the consideration of these grave problems Mr. Wallas brings the same broad conception of psychology which distinguished his earlier work, which has even been improved at certain points. It is particularly refreshing to find an author who attempts an analysis of society upon the basis of a synthetic psychology.¹ His general psychology combines the introspective and behavioristic theories; he has enriched his knowledge of the unconscious processes in the individual mind by a study of the indispensable discoveries made by the leaders in modern abnormal psychology; and, finally, his social psychology rejects all one-sided explanations and is based upon the broad conception of the reactions of the individual

¹ A good analysis of Wallas' psychology is to be found in W. C. Mitchell, "Human Behavior and Economics," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, November, 1914, pp. 12-18.

organism to the complex of stimuli from the environment. Again, he has now become an avowed sociologist. The word was mentioned but once in his earlier book, but now all his analyses are made from the "sociological viewpoint." All in all, it is a more valuable study than his other work, but being a general treatise on psychological sociology and not concerned with political problems, except incidentally, nothing more than a brief summary of its chief positions can be here presented.

The society of the present day is to be traced to the great mechanical inventions of the Industrial Revolution, which gave the material basis for our civilization. The social transformation has been as far-reaching as the industrial and far less happy in its attendant circumstances. Instead of a social system based upon local association and personal relationships, we now have one founded upon world-wide, impersonal, and almost mechanical relations.¹ Those great scientific discoveries, which have made the technical changes in industry possible, have not been accompanied by a parallel and proportional development of a science of social relationships. Psychological progress has been diffused only among a small class of experts, and has not permeated society in a manner comparable to the knowledge of technical processes in industry.²

It is the aim of Mr. Wallas to supply this need and to discover how far a synthetic psychology of social processes can go toward discovering a way out of our present social dilemma. In formulating a satisfactory theory of social psychology upon which to base an analysis of society, Mr. Wallas contends that one must accept the doctrine that the type-forms of human conduct are the result of inherited and acquired dispositions to act in a certain manner, stimulated by the experiences of the organism within its environment.³ The two especially important complex dispositions in mankind are instinct and intelligence, and Mr. Wallas, somewhat in opposition to his position in his previous work, insists that man is as naturally disposed to thought as he is to instinctive action.⁴ But human dispositions, either instinctive or intellectual, cannot

¹ *The Great Society*, pp. 3 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 21 ff., 133 ff.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 17 ff., 322 f.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 40 ff.

function properly unless they are acted upon by the "appropriate stimuli" in the environment.¹ Unstimulated dispositions develop into what he designates as "balked dispositions," or what modern dynamic psychologists would call "repressed complexes." These balked dispositions cause that nervous and mental instability, so prevalent in modern civilization, which has no basis in organic defects of the nervous system, and which is the fundamental pathological characteristic of modern society.² The reason for the prevalence of balked dispositions in modern society is that our hereditary natural make-up has changed but little for ages, while the environment which stimulates that nature has been completely revolutionized in the last century.³ While no one can hope to revive exactly the same set of stimuli as originally operated, it is the task of modern social reorganization to discover and supply equivalent stimuli which will release that repressed energy dammed up by our balked dispositions, and make a happy and efficient life once more possible for the majority of the race.⁴

On the basis of such a conception of social psychology Mr. Wallas finds that those theories which emphasize but one subjective aspect of the psychology of social processes are inadequate and unsatisfactory. Among the theories of this type which he rejects are those based upon habit, fear, hedonism, love, hatred, and the various psychologies of the crowd founded on imitation, sympathy, and suggestion.⁵ The problems of modern society can only be solved by the application of carefully reasoned thought, and while thought may have a subconscious basis, it is highly essential that society shall do all in its power to improve those aspects of thought which can be controlled by deliberate and conscious solution and determination.⁶

Since human activities are all an expression of thought, will, and emotion, efficient social organization must make provision for bringing all of these aspects of human activity into play in an effective and well-balanced manner.⁷ The organized activity of

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 57 ff.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 63 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 62 f.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 67-68.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 69-175.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 176 ff.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 237 ff.

society in this direction, however, has thus far been distressingly inadequate. The old method of stimulating thought by oral discussion has been largely displaced in modern society by the mechanical devices for imparting information, which, while they are much more efficient in distributing printed information, are greatly inferior in originating new thought.¹ Particularly difficult is it for the average workingman to develop any independent or fruitful thought, owing to the destruction of the close personal relationships that formerly existed in the small groups of workmen, and the efforts of the vested interests, political and economic, to exploit the workingman's ignorance by the perversions and distortions of truth in the printed journals that reach the working class.² The attempt to create a condition of effective thinking by discussion in modern legislatures has degenerated into a burlesque which makes the members good-natured cynics. This travesty reaches its height in the speeches of American Congressmen written by their secretaries and published, without being delivered, in the *Congressional Record*.³

The effective organization of the social will is equally deficient in modern society. The three contending varieties of will-organization-individualism, based on the institution of private property; socialism, founded upon the proposition to extend the functions of the democratic state; and syndicalism, demanding a government on the basis of representation by occupations—all possess certain advantages, but are equally inadequate when taken alone.⁴ It is the necessary next step in political invention to find by experiment the correct combination of these three contending principles.

As to the organization of society to promote human happiness, it seems that, while modern industrialism has tremendously increased the technical devices for producing commodities for human comfort and convenience, it is equally true that the process has failed proportionately to increase the sum total of human happiness.⁵ The great advances have been made with the aim of

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 240 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 251 ff.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 280 ff.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 290 ff.; 309, 319.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 322 ff. Cf. Veblen, *Theory of Business Enterprise*; and *Theory of the Leisure Class*.

increasing the production of wealth rather than securing a greater amount of satisfaction in its consumption. One of the most alarming aspects of the modern social transformation is that society has allowed the process to gain such momentum before it awakened to what was going on that the new developments have begun to get beyond the control of society.

That which chiefly angers and excites us now, as we contemplate the society in which we live, is not a conviction that the world is a worse place than it has ever been, but the feeling that we have lost grip over the course of events, and are stupidly wasting the power over nature which might make the world infinitely better.¹

It is to be the test of the success of modern society as to whether it will be able to make up by future efforts what it has lost through its lethargy and apathy in the past. The laboring class has been especially unfortunate in this transition. The impersonal, monotonous, large-scale, and highly subdivided and standardized industry of today has destroyed the pleasure of manual labor, and the conditions of urban life among the working classes have made it difficult for them to achieve happiness outside of working hours.² The conclusion of Mr. Wallas' work is its most unsatisfactory part. In his proposals as to how to organize society to attain happiness he mixes many fertile suggestions as to diversifying interests and economizing effort with Aristotle's metaphysical conception of the "mean" as the ideal, and ends by practically throwing up his hands and passing the problem over to philosophy. Fortunately, he had already provided his readers with enough suggestions as to a more practical and promising program so that they need not assent to his conclusions.³

c) *Our Social Heritage* and socio-psychological suggestions for social reconstruction and improvement. Mr. Wallas' latest work, and the logical completion of his body of social theory, is contained in a series of lectures delivered in the New School for Social Research and in Yale University. It was published in 1921 under the title *Our Social Heritage*. Each of his books seems to have proceeded naturally out of the demand produced by its predecessor.

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 323.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 323 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 348 ff.

His *Human Nature in Politics* attacked the current intellectualism in political, social, and economic theory. His *Great Society*, while assuming the dominance of subconscious and emotional elements, insisted that improvement could only come through rational thought and conscious effort. *Our Social Heritage* is a well-reasoned analysis of important factors involved in any program for the conscious improvement of society. It deals with "the ideas, habits, and institutions directly concerned in the political, economic, and social organization of those modern communities which constitute 'The Great Society.' " It has an immediate pragmatic and remedial purpose, for he believes that without an adequate understanding of our "socially inherited ways of living and thinking" and a determination better to adjust them to the needs of the day, humanity will speedily be confronted with greater disasters than the world-war.

Mr. Wallas takes as his starting-point the essential distinction between "nature" and "nurture." Man's nature, or his physiological and neurological equipment, has not changed for thousands of years. Indeed, man may be said to have become "biologically parasitic on his social heritage." The other animals can thrive without a social heritage, but man would soon become extinct without its support. "Nurture," upon which man must depend for his present existence and for his future progress, includes both individual acquisitions and those which come to him from society past and present. The cultural supremacy of man has been primarily, if not wholly, a product of his social heritage. Likewise, any hope of future improvement depends upon a better understanding and utilization of our socially inherited culture and institutions. Yet this problem is becoming progressively more difficult, for the great increase of our body of pertinent information is making it more difficult to find a means for an adequate transmission of our social heritage and the rapid technological changes are necessitating a continual social readjustment.¹

Any adequate utilization and reconstruction of our social heritage involves sustained muscular and mental effort. Impulses must be to some extent replaced by conscious effort. There must

¹ *Our Social Heritage*, chap. i.

come into being a self-conscious will for improvement. It is not easy, however, to sustain conscious effort. Physiological reactions and instincts have been evolved to meet continuous needs. Higher conscious activity has been produced to serve only occasional wants. Therefore, conscious effort brings a high degree of fatigue. It is doubtful whether either conscious mental or muscular effort can function with decent efficiency unless it is accompanied by a free play of the emotions and the force of the "artistic drive." Conscious intellectual effort and artificial intellectual methods have been most successful in pure science and technology and least so in the social sciences, but the improvement of our social heritage depends upon a more scientific and pragmatic social science.¹

In a very real sense social reconstruction and the reorganization of our social heritage depend upon devising better ways for the development and organization of various types of co-operation—group, national, and international. There are different forms of co-operation exhibited in the biological world—the leaderless and unorganized co-operation of the ants, the co-operation of cattle under a single leader, and the co-operation of a wolf pack in which each member is affected by instincts of both leadership and obedience. Mankind exemplifies this last or wolf type of the co-operation of a "loosely and intermittently gregarious animal." Man is further capable of consciously organized and directed co-operation, but this requires unusual effort and produces a high degree of fatigue. Even conscious group co-operation has as yet been but imperfectly realized by mankind and tends to break down in times of stress, as proved by the disasters of the British Dardanelles and Mesopotamian expeditions during the war. National co-operation is far more artificial than group co-operation and depends to a much greater extent on socially inherited knowledge and conscious effort. Group co-operation rests to a considerable extent upon personal knowledge and contacts, but "a modern civilized man can never see or hear the nation of which he is a member, and, if he thinks or feels about it, he must do so by employing some acquired entity of the mind." An accurate idea of the nation then is essential if we are to have any "reliable stimulus to large-

¹ *Op. cit.*, chap. ii.

scale co-operative emotion and co-operative action." The average citizen, however, has no systematic method for building up his "idea of the nation." It is the unconscious and carelessly acquired product of his daily experiences. Much of it is due to conscious propaganda by the vested interests, for though the average citizen may be aimless, careless, and thoughtless, "the controllers of newspapers, especially of the sinister American or British Journals whose writers are apparently encouraged to 'color the news' as well as their comments on the news, in accordance with the will of a multi-millionaire proprietor, know pretty exactly what they are doing." Hence, if we are to have any solid basis for national co-operation we must work out a more scientific method of acquiring our idea of a nation and its accompanying emotions. Mr. Wallas submits some interesting and thoughtful suggestions toward this end. We should start with a Cartesian skepticism and advance by critical reasoning. Our conclusions must be based upon a careful and patient observation of our fellow-citizens, their type, actions, and aspirations. Such scrutiny of our countrymen will convince us of the wide divergence and variety of type, fitness, tastes, and capacity which exist. The fallacious notion of the uniformity of men has been the curse of modern politics and economics. Yet we can never have a stable national organization or effective national co-operation without a greater degree of common consent to the existing social and economic order than that which now prevails. The problem will probably best be solved by recognizing this diversity of taste and capacity and providing an equality of opportunity for the diversified population to realize their aspirations according to their differing capacities. The better adjustment of individual tasks and responsibilities to individual differences between human beings must become "the conscious, organized and effective purpose of modern civilization."

World-co-operation is even more difficult of achievement than national co-operation. If one is to approach intelligently the problem of international relations he must make the initial admission that "the change of scale from national co-operation to world-co-operation involves a change in the form and character of the co-operative process. It is a change of kind as well as degree."

Many of those instinctive and emotional forces which produce group and national co-operation instinctively impel us to hate aliens and induce a combative attitude toward them. Yet world-co-operation in certain phases of economic and commercial activity has become a basic fact in modern life and it is futile to retain Cobden's dream that we can enjoy commercial intercourse without incurring political friction. There is little hope of building up a sound internationalism on a purely instinctive or emotional basis. It must be founded on conscious thought and reasoned calculation of results. Especially must we learn to calculate the disastrous results of a world-war and obtain therefrom an impulse to avoid war and a willingness to take those steps which are necessary to prevent its coming. Wilson's "Fourteen Points" once seemed destined to provide a basis for rational international co-operation, but the opportunity was ingloriously lost at Paris. Certain improvements must be made if we are to have any effective world-co-operation. We must abandon generalizations about an abstract state which will not apply to any concrete state; we must study history, government, law, and biology from the new problem attitude of world-co-operation; we must work out a control of the press which will make it impotent to debase statesmanship and arouse unnecessary international hatred and will make it a real force in sound international education; we must reconsider liberty, independence, nationality, and equality from an international point of view and give them greater realization at home; we must stimulate political invention so as to adapt national institutions to supernational needs; and we must co-operate in every way in any procedure which will produce an international outlook. It would even be worth while to send representatives to the League of Nations meeting at Geneva, if only to co-operate in an international survey of the heavens.¹

Since the world-war there have been many appeals from representatives of organized Christianity, and especially from those who come from the more conservative religious circles, to make religion the basis of world-union and co-operation. Mr. Wallas suggests that it would be most pertinent to inquire what organized

¹ *Op. cit.*, chaps. iii-iv, ix, xi-xii.

religion has contributed during the last ten years to make good its claim to fitness to assume the leadership in world-unity. His examination of the evidence constitutes an overwhelming indictment of organized Christianity. Without notable exceptions the church has aligned itself with the reactionary and vicious elements in the international situation. The German Lutherans supported Prussian militarism and the invasion of Belgium. The Austrian Catholics were the leaders in the anti-Serbian movement. The Anglican Church vigorously favored crushing peace terms for Germany and condoned the Irish policy of the government and the massacres in India. The French Catholic elements have supported the peace of revenge and French post-war diplomacy. Above all, sacramental Christianity lacks the essential ethical element which is necessary for social reconstruction. No group accepts the sacraments with more reverence and enthusiasm than the Spanish brigands. He concludes that

The special task of our generation might be so to work and think as to be able to hand on to the boys and girls who, fifty years hence, at some other turning point of world history, may gather in the schools, the heritage of a world-outlook deeper and wider and more helpful than that of modern Christendom.¹

Science also needs to be readapted before it can be of much assistance in world-co-operation. It has been of great aid in technology, but it is indispensable that science be moralized and that scientific methods be adopted rapidly in the moral and social sciences.

In this manner Mr. Wallas makes a plea for conscious, rational, and "telic" progress which entitles him to a place with Lester F. Ward and L. T. Hobhouse.

Mr. Wallas, in addition to the general subject of the improvement of types of co-operation, considers a number of subjects which are of great significance in political theory. In treating the subject of the control of national co-operation, he discusses the cardinal problem of contemporary political theory, namely, the question of territorial and capitation representation versus vocationalism and pluralism. While he severely criticizes the doctrines of vocationalism, he admits at the outset that the future will probably witness

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 291.

a compromise between territorial representation and vocationalism rather than a complete victory of either. Mr. Wallas adduces an imposing array of objections to vocationalism. It produces independence and arrogance in the actions of the group and in its attitude toward other groups and toward the state. It breeds conservatism because men are more conservative in professional affairs than elsewhere. It is based chiefly upon the identity of men rather than their differences, which are much more numerous and obvious. It is ill adapted to the accumulation of capital through temporarily unproductive labor and is not well fitted for changes in the function and relationship of workers. The lessons of history, as proved by the medieval guilds, are contrary to its contentions. During the late war the territorial state took the lead in the attempt to adapt skill and taste to public needs while the trade unions resisted this effort.¹ It must be borne in mind, of course, that exponents of vocationalism, such as Cole and Hobson, take exactly the opposite position as to the effect of the vocational principle. Mr. Wallas proceeds to examine the various professions in the light of his generalized indictment of vocationalism and is convinced that they afford concrete confirmation of his generalizations.² Those readers who have also examined Mr. Cole's *Social Theory* will probably come to the pessimistic conclusion that society is confronted by the alternatives of the "devil" of territorialism and the "deep sea" of vocationalism.

Mr. Wallas analyzes the problems of liberty, rights, and honor from the socio-psychological point of view. Liberty is a condition in which human impulses are not obstructed. It is to be justified on the ground that the obstruction of normal impulses is accompanied by detrimental moral and psychological results. Yet, inasmuch as we are not perfectly adapted to either our primitive or our present environment we can expect no complete realization of all our impulses—no perfect liberty. Further, it is necessary to recognize that the results of the obstruction of impulses differ according to the source of the obstruction. We rarely sense our lack of freedom when nonhuman causes prevent us from following our impulses,

¹ *Op. cit.*, chap. v.

² *Ibid.*, chap. vi.

or when restrained by prevailing beliefs and practices or by recognized inequalities. Our sense of liberty and freedom is outraged only when there is an arbitrary interference with normal human relationships and aspirations. Contrasting the theories of liberty held by Pericles and John Stuart Mill, he finds the doctrines of the former far more sound and helpful, for Pericles stressed the fact that liberty has positive implications of duty and responsibility and is not a mere negative absence of all forms of coercion. Liberty implies not only the opportunity to exercise one's faculties, but also the conscious and organized will to do so. The doctrine of natural rights depends upon the same psychological considerations. It is founded upon the fact that the obstruction of the normal course of important instincts by human action "causes a feeling of painful resentment" and leads to a lessening of individual and social efficiency. But, as these instincts were produced in a primitive environment, we cannot expect at present to enjoy a complete realization of our instinctive cravings, nor would it be for the good of the community if we could do so. This distinction has been the cause of the struggle between the psychological and the metaphysical exponents of the doctrine of natural rights. The honor of the individual no longer requires direct retaliation for a wrong, but is satisfied by a legal suit. We may expect a similar evolution in the methods of dealing with national honor. The sociopsychological independence of the individual is valuable only "if it leads to certain positive mental and moral efforts."¹

Finally, Mr. Wallas deals with the value and significance of constitutional monarchy. Its importance was well stated by Bagehot, who declared that it supplied a personal symbol of an impersonal power and thereby produced loyalty. In England the monarch has symbolized not only national power, but also imperial unity. The advantages of the person-symbol are that it requires no mental effort whatever to be comprehended and that the mere sight of the monarch evokes loyalty. There are also significant disadvantages. The symbol may behave much like a human being, it may prove insane like George III or a meddlesome nuisance like Victoria. Though a sight of the king may produce loyalty, it

¹ *Ibid.*, chaps. vii-vi ii.

supplies little information about the real nature of the English government. Symbols lead to instinctive and emotional reactions, and not to conscious and reasoned action. Symbols are particularly inadequate in matters concerning international relations. While Mr. Wallas does not specifically commit himself on this subject, the reader may legitimately infer that he believes that the person-symbol of the crown is no longer indispensable to the most efficient type of government in England.¹

The above summary of his more salient points in this latest work gives but a faint impression of the content of the book with its wealth of concrete illustrative material, but it will probably justify Mr. Laski's contention that it is the product of "sober wisdom."²

Even this brief and inadequate summary of Mr. Wallas' works will suffice to convince the reader of their importance. If, as Professor Tenney says, the prime end of sociology is a rational criticism of public policy, then few writers have acquitted themselves of the task imposed by their subject in such an efficient manner as has Mr. Wallas. His works represent in a general way the best that sociology has to offer in the way of suggestions to political science. He insists that first of all political science must be modernized, both in subject-matter and in method. It must take account of the vast changes in civilization since the time of Aristotle, or even of Montesquieu and Burke, and deal effectively with the new problems which these changes have produced. It can no longer afford to concern itself with metaphysical questions about society or with unreal conceptions of human nature, but must deal with actual conditions of the present, and deal with them scientifically. By this scientific treatment he means that political science must base its generalizations only upon the fundamental laws of human psychology as revealed by careful statistical

¹ *Op. cit.*, chap. x.

² It is especially gratifying to note that Mr. Wallas has apparently wholly escaped the effects of the war hysteria which has distorted the writings of so many sociologists and publicists. The contrast between *Our Social Heritage* and *The Group Mind* is especially instructive on this point. Yet Mr. Wallas relies to a distressing degree upon English data and illustrations, a procedure which is all the more unpardonable in an author with his extensive knowledge of the United States.

measurement of human conduct, not only in political groupings but in the wider forms of association. To be sure there are many defects in his work. The professional psychologist would quarrel with him over many points of detail, and he gives little evidence of having read widely in the strictly sociological literature of recent times, but these defects are more than compensated for by the abundance of those illuminating concrete illustrations of his main propositions which a keenly observant and reflective mind has drawn from a close contact with many phases of English life in a quarter of a century of active connection with academic and political affairs. Until students of political science turn their attention from an exclusive concern with the formal treatises on their subject from Pufendorf to Burgess, and deal seriously with the defects in their subject which Mr. Wallas has so clearly revealed, there can be little hope that academic political science will have any considerable leavening effect upon modern political life.¹

[AUTHOR'S NOTE.—It had been the plan of the writer, when this series of articles was projected, to include a consideration of the English contributions to pluralistic theories of society, to anthropological and historical sociology in its bearing upon political theory, and to the study of the biological factors operating in social and political life. Since that time, however, the need for such articles has practically disappeared. Professor F. W. Coker has given us an admirable summary of the

¹ This cursory account of contributions of English social psychology to political theory should not be concluded without a brief reference to the thesis of a brilliant lecture given by the eminent English psychologist and ethnologist, W. H. R. Rivers, at the New School for Social Research in March of 1920. Reviewing the history of psychology he showed how the older psychology was almost entirely intellectualistic and dominated by those who came to psychology from philosophy. Two later movements had the same effect. Experimental psychology stressed the intellectual factors because they were more amenable to measurement. Educational psychology placed nearly all the emphasis on intellectual faculties. Recent developments have seriously challenged this type of approach. Thorndike, McDougall, and others have shown the vital significance of the instinctive factors. The social psychology of Durkheim, Tarde, Sumner, Ross, and others has applied psychological doctrine to social processes. More important than any other recent development in psychology, however, has been the development of medical psychology and psychoanalysis by such men as Freud, Adler, Jung, and Jones. They have shown the significance of the subconscious and emotional elements in mental life and have for the first time given us a synthetic view of the mind. In endeavoring to solve problems of individual conduct the sex element has been shown to be the chief drive in civilian

pluralistic theories of society in his article on "The Technique of the Pluralistic State," in the *American Political Science Review* for May, 1921. The chief problems in the field of anthropological and historical sociology have been set forth in three papers by Professor W. F. Ogburn, Dr. A. A. Goldenweiser, and myself in the *Publications of the American Sociological Society* for 1921. The biological factors, analyzed briefly in Bristol's *Social Adaptation*, pp. 56-120; and in Todd's *Theories of Social Progress*, pp. 239-321, are to be treated thoroughly and systematically in articles and monographs projected by Professor Frank H. Hankins.]

life, while in war the instinct of self-preservation assumes the major proportions. The underlying mental mechanisms have, however, been proved to be the same in both cases. It is probable that these mechanisms can also be utilized to interpret the defects in social, as well as in individual, conduct. There is the same tendency in social circles as in the individual to repress unpleasant and disagreeable facts and experiences. The most important disagreeable and repulsive fact in modern society to those who dominate public policy is the threatened and probable change in the status of the social and economic classes. This produces a powerful mechanism of class defense in the violent opposition to any expressions of radicalism. The only hope of an effective social therapeutic lies in obtaining a social device for telling the truth about social defects with as much frankness and thoroughness as the physician reveals individual defects of character and conduct to the patient. The essential parts of this lecture are reproduced in an article on "Psychology and the War," in *Scribner's Magazine*, August, 1920. See also his brochure on *Psychology and Sociology*.

In his promised elaboration of this point of view in a forthcoming work, one may look for one of the first definitive attempts to apply the Freudian doctrine to social and political psychology. An American contribution to this field is contained in Walter Lippmann's *Preface to Politics*.